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Abstract 
 
This study examines the long-term changes in the distribution of rural income in China from the 
late 1980s until the mid-2010s. The major findings are summarized as follows. First, contrasting 
trends are found in the contributions of agricultural income and wage earnings, which reflect the 
structural changes in rural income caused by the dual processes of economic development and 
systemic transition during the post-Mao era. Second, inequality in wealth is found to have 
become increasingly important for understanding rural inequality. Third, small but substantial 
improvements are found in the redistributive and poverty impacts of public transfers before and 
after implementation of the pro-rural public policies during the first decade of this century, 
representing a historical reversal in the long-term urban-biased public policy in contemporary 
China. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Rapid and prolonged economic development in China has dramatically changed the economic 
structure in the rural areas. Since implementation of the “reform and opening” policy in the late 
1970s, rural households have been released from the constraints of collective farming and have 
been granted autonomy over their agricultural production and marketing, thus resulting in 
improved production incentives. Furthermore, the rapid growth of township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) and manufacturing enterprises in the urban areas has presented huge 
opportunities for the rural labor force to engage in off-farm employment in both the rural and 
urban areas. Recently, the boom in investment in real estate and stock markets has been gradually 
spreading to the rural areas, particularly those areas surrounding the large cities. These prolonged 
and drastic changes in the rural economy have influenced socioeconomic inequalities among 
rural households. Income inequalities in rural areas have also been rising because of the 
structural changes in the rural economy, thereby increasing the importance of effective rural 
public policy for reducing inequality in order to maintain sustainable economic development and 
social stability in China. 
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This chapter examines long-term changes in the distribution of rural income in China from the 
late 1980s to the mid-2010s. It focuses on changes in the redistributive and poverty impacts of 
public policy as well as the structural evolution of rural income and the contribution of the major 
income components to overall inequality. Implementation of a series of pro-rural (huinong) 
policies during the first decade of the 2000s marked a historical change in contemporary China’s 
public policy, which during both the Mao and the post-Mao eras had been heavily biased to the 
urban areas. This change in policy is due to the enhancement of state capacity brought about by 
economic development and systemic transition during the reform era.1 
Therefore, to better understand the economy in contemporary China, it is important to 
examine to what extent the new public transfers, such as production/living subsidies and social 
security benefits, affect the distribution of rural income. Although the pro-rural policies in the 
2000s have been a common research focus, relatively few studies examine empirical significance 
of these policies from the perspective of income distribution. Among such studies, Wang (2010), 
in an examination of the redistributive impact of pro-rural policies, finds the income 
                                                   
1 Reform of the household registration system (hukou) was implemented in the mid-1980s and, along 
with the urbanization of the rural areas, has been enforced since the early 2000s, resulting in a rapid 
expansion of rural-urban migration as well as a gradual decline in the rural population. It may be that the 
qualitative attributes of rural households gradually changed during this period due to natural selection and 
selective urbanization (e.g., older and less-educated people tended to remain in the rural areas). Rigorous 
examination of the selection bias caused by the structural changes in the rural economy, a subject 
requiring further research, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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redistribution brought about by these policies mitigated rural income inequalities and reduced 
urban–rural income disparities. Qi (2011) investigates the effects of the newly introduced public 
medical insurance system on rural income inequalities. Lin and Wong (2012), in an examination 
of government transfers to rural households, confirm the positive impact of subsidies and 
reimbursements on rural household income. 
Given that this study shares a focus with previous literature, in this chapter we utilize more 
recent nationally representative CHIP (China Household Income Project) survey data, which 
include comprehensive coverage of income and transfer payments. The data are compiled from 
the rural household components of the five rounds of the CHIP surveys, that is, 1988, 1995, 2002, 
2007, and 2013. The survey database covers rural households across the twenty-five-year period 
from 1988 to 2013, which was a time of rapid and prolonged changes in the rural economy in 
terms of the structure of household income as well as implementation of public policies affecting 
rural households. 
Two major empirical approaches are adopted in this study. First, using inequality 
decomposition methodologies, we identify the major components of income that affect income 
inequality in rural China. Second, we examine the impacts of public transfers on income 
inequality and poverty by comparing inequality and poverty measures both with and without 
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specific public transfers. 
We separate household income into six components: net income from agriculture, net income 
from nonagricultural self-employment/business, wage earnings, asset income, imputed rental 
income from owner-occupied housing (hereafter referred to as “imputed rent”), and net transfer 
payments. The first two components consist of income earned from production or other forms of 
work, whereas wage earnings consist of income from family members who are working in wage 
employment outside the home. Asset income includes interest, dividends, and other income from 
assets. Imputed rent from owner-occupied housing, an important income component, is estimated 
based on a rate-of-return approach.2 In general, we employ the Gini decomposition method to 
estimate the contributions of each income component to total inequality. 
Our definition of rural household income is basically consistent with the definition used in the 
                                                   
2 We estimate our imputed rents from owner-occupied housing (R) independently to maintain consistency 
of the estimations among the five rounds of the survey, incorporating minor revisions of the CHIP official 
estimations. More specifically, according to Sato et al. (2013), we adopt the following formula: 
)( MViR −=                                                 
where V denotes the market value of owner-occupied housing, M denotes the amount of mortgage loans, 
and i is the rate of return from housing. The rate of return is the interest rate on thirty-year government 
bonds. The interest rates in 2002, 2007, and 2013 were 3.2028 percent, 4.3625 percent, and 4.8992 
percent, respectively. Due to the lack of market value data for owner-occupied housing and the relevant 
interest rates for government bonds in 1988 and 1995, following Khan and Riskin (2001), we substitute 
the book value of housing construction (or purchase) cost and 8 percent of the market value as the rate of 
return in each year to calculate the imputed rents. In addition, mortgage loan data are not included in the 
2007 CHIP survey. Because the distributions of mortgage loans in 2002 and 2013 are substantially 
skewed to the right (i.e., higher values), substituting the mean percentage share of the mortgage loans in 
the construction value in 2002 and 2013 for 2007 is unsuitable for the estimations. Therefore, we do not 
deduct the mortgage loans from the construction value to calculate the imputed rent. It should be noted 
that the amount of imputed rent for 2007 tends to be somewhat overestimated. 
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entire research project, as described in Chapter 1. However, we have adjusted the definitions to 
allow for a comparison of rural income across the various survey rounds as well as to properly 
evaluate the effects of public policies on income distribution and poverty.3 More specifically, 
our definition of transfer payments is restricted to public transfers, and net transfer payments are 
defined as the sum of public transfers to households (social security benefits/reimbursements and 
other transfers from the government/collectives) minus transfers from households to the public 
sector (taxes, levies/fees, social security contributions, and other payments to the 
government/collectives). Other miscellaneous private transfers, such as gifts for ceremonial 
exchanges, are not included in the net transfer payments and total income. In addition, as noted 
above, we have adjusted imputed rent to maintain consistency among the five CHIP survey 
rounds. 
Based on our definition, we can easily identify changes in public policy from the signs of the 
net transfer payments. If transfers from households exceed payments to households, net transfer 
payments are negative; such cases occurred in the 1990s and the early 2000s when there was a 
heavy peasant burden from taxes and levies/fees. We will examine the contributions of positive 
or negative net public transfers to income inequality and to the poverty indices by comparing the 
                                                   
3 Regarding the 2013 CHIP, the average per capita income gap between the official CHIP and our 
definitions is quite small, accounting for only 2.7 percent. 
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outcomes with and without specific public transfers. This is our second empirical approach 
adopted in this chapter. 
It should be noted that there are limitations to our study with respect to the estimation of net 
transfer payments. First, invisible public transfers through institutional/policy interventions, such 
as the compulsory grain purchase quota at below-market prices (dinggou renwu), are not counted 
as taxation on rural households. The interventions in grain marketing, a legacy of the Mao era, 
continued until the beginning of the 2000s (Ikegami 2012; Hoken 2014).4 Second, the subsidies 
for compulsory education that targeted rural households are also not examined in this chapter 
because it is difficult to estimate the amount of school fees that were exempted.  Moreover, 
information on boarding students is unavailable in the data.5 Third, although unpaid labor 
                                                   
4 A major reason why invisible public transfers through grain marketing are not included as public 
payments is because of the lack of detailed information on grain sales in the CHIP surveys. A relatively 
detailed questionnaire survey on sales of agricultural products was distributed only in the 1988 CHIP 
survey, and few households sold the same products through different marketing channels (such as grain 
quotas, contract sales with the government, and sales through the free market). Therefore, identification of 
the appropriate market prices for specific grains will produce considerable measurement errors, resulting 
in an inaccurate measurement of agricultural income. However, agricultural inputs tended to be 
distributed at discount prices to farmers who met the grain quota, which partially supplemented the 
hidden losses stemming from the grain quota. As the CHIP survey does not contain detailed price and 
quantity data on agricultural inputs, it is difficult to come up with an accurate measurement of the 
invisible public transfers through grain marketing channels in terms of both input and output markets. 
5 Indirect public transfers based on the policy of “two exemptions and one subsidy” (liangmian yibu) 
were implemented nationwide in 2006. The subsidy consists of an exemption from tuition and textbook 
fees for all rural households and subsidies for poor boarding students in rural areas. Li and Luo (2007), by 
utilizing the urban–rural income gap in China based on the average public education expenditure in the 
urban and rural areas as an estimate of the direct subsidies to households, argue that the urban–rural 
income gap increased when public education expenditures and other social services were incorporated 
into household income. 
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contributions (yiwugong) were a non-negligible component of rural taxation until the early 2000s, 
here we do not include the monetary value of such labor contributions to tax and levy/fee 
collections because of a lack of data, except in the 2002 survey.6 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of income 
inequality in rural China from 1988 to 2013. Section 3 decomposes total income inequality into 
its major components to capture the structural changes in rural household income during the 
unique dual processes of economic development and systemic transition in China. Special 
attention is paid to public transfer payments and the changing redistributive effects of these 
transfers. Section 4 summarizes the structure of pro-rural policies in the 2000s and further 
investigates the redistributive and poverty impacts of various types of public transfers. The 
conclusion in Section 5 describes policy implications for improving income inequality in rural 
China. 
 
II. The Trend in Income Inequality from the late 1980s through 2013 
A. Income Per Capita and the Gini Coefficients in the CHIP Surveys 
Table 5.1 shows the average per capita rural household income during the five rounds of the 
                                                   
6 See Sato, Li, and Yue (2008) for a discussion about regressivity in rural taxation in 2002, including the 
unpaid labor contributions. 
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CHIP surveys based on the above-mentioned income definition. We utilize regional weights to 
estimate the national average of per capita income and the Gini coefficients for rural households 
(not including migrant households). Regional (Eastern, Central, and Western) weights, which are 
calculated based on the sizes of the provincial and regional rural populations, were prepared by 
the CHIP research team for 2007 and 2013. We extend these weights by using the same 
procedures on the previous CHIP rounds. In addition, we employ the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) index developed by Brandt and Holz (2006) as well as their updated database in order to 
examine the impacts of spatial price differences. 
As shown in Table 5.1, the average unadjusted per capita income is slightly higher than 
adjusted per capita income, except in 1988. With regard to 2007 and 2013, the gaps are 6.36 
percent and 5.98 percent, respectively, slightly larger than the gaps during the earlier rounds. 
Compared with the average per capita rural income of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
average per capita incomes in the CHIP are relatively higher at 31.2 percent (1988), 24.0 percent 
(1995), 17.2 percent (2002), 11.3 percent (2007), and 36.8 percent (2013).7 
                                                   
7 The gaps can be explained by two factors. One is our reevaluation of agricultural products consumed by 
rural households for the 1988 and 1995 CHIP using market prices instead of the official agricultural 
procurement price. The other is the inclusion of imputed rent for owner-occupied housing, which is not 
accounted for in the NBS rural household income. The latter effect is more obvious in 2013, constituting 
approximately 57 percent of the income gap between the CHIP and the NBS. During the period from the 
late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the contributions of imputed rent were limited because of the lower housing 
prices of housing as well as because the housing market in China was underdeveloped. However, 
11 
 
The estimated Gini coefficients are also presented in Table 5.1. The Gini coefficients 
adjusted by the regional weight and the PPP are relatively lower than those that are unadjusted, 
but the gaps are quite small, at 1–3 percent, except for in 1988. The long-term trend in income 
inequality in rural China measured by the adjusted Gini coefficients can be summarized as 
follows. A considerable rise in the Gini coefficients in the CHIP survey is observed between 
1988 and 1995, increasing from 0.323 in 1988 to 0.387 in 1995. In 2002, the coefficients 
remained almost the same level, at 0.370, but in 2007 they dropped slightly to 0.355. Since then, 
the coefficient rose again, reaching 0.398 in 2013, which was the highest in all the rounds. In 
comparison, , the Gini coefficients reported by the NBS based on the NBS rural household 
survey exhibited a gradual rise from the 1980s to the 1990s; thereafter, beginning in the early 
2000s it remained stable at a relatively elevated level (Guojia tongjiju, Zhuhu diaocha 
bangongshi 2014).  
[Table 5.1 about here] 
 
B. Annual Growth of Per Capita Income by Income Decile 
To understand income inequality in China, it is necessary to look at the differences in income 
                                                                                                                                                                    
selection of the price index for self-consumption of agricultural products is more crucial for explaining 
income differences during this period. See Riskin, Zhao, and Li (2001). 
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growth among the different income strata. Figure 5.1 shows the annual real growth of adjusted 
per capita income between each CHIP survey round by income deciles. It is apparent that the 
annual income growth rates between 2007 and 2013 are much higher than those in the previous 
years for all the income deciles. The growth rates between 2007 and 2013 reach approximately 
10–14 percent and they are distributed proportionally among the income deciles. As will be 
discussed in the following section, the rapid growth of real income between 2007 and 2013 was 
mainly caused by an upsurge in the share of imputed rent in total income, which reached no less 
than 13 percent for all income deciles. 
Relatively even income growth among the income deciles is observed between 2002 and 
2007, except for the bottom decile, and the growth rates during this period are generally much 
lower than those from 2007 to 2013. These results indicate that rural households of all income 
strata experienced high growth from 2002 to 2007, but the benefits were relatively limited in the 
lower income strata, especially for the bottom decile.  
In contrast, the distribution of the annual income growth from 1988 through 2002 among the 
income deciles is rather different than that after 2002. Specifically, except for the lowest income 
decile, the real growth rate of annual income between 1988 and 1995 shows a positive 
correlation with the level of income, resulting in a relative upsurge in the Gini coefficient 
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between 1988 and 1995. Between 1995 and 2002, however, the growth rate of income decreased 
slightly from lower to higher income strata, that is, lower-income households enjoyed faster 
income growth than higher-income strata, leading to a slight reduction in the Gini coefficient 
from 0.387 to 0.370. 
[Figure 5.1 about here] 
 
C. Regional Disparities in Income Inequality 
To investigate regional differences in the change of income inequality, we divide China into three 
geo-economic regions: the Eastern (coastal) region, the Central region, and the Western (inland) 
region. Figure 5.2, which summarizes the trends in the Gini coefficients of per capita income by 
region, suggests that until 2007 the Gini coefficients were highest in the Eastern region, where 
economic development was the most advanced among the three regions. However, trends in the 
Gini coefficients from 2007 through 2013 are similar across regions. Specifically, the Gini 
coefficients increased from 1988 to 1995 in all three regions. Thereafter, the Gini coefficients 
gradually dropped in the 2000s, but then rose again between 2007 and 2013, especially in the 
Central and Western regions. 
[Figure 5.2 about here] 
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It should be noted that the exacerbation of income inequalities in the Central and Western 
regions from 2007 to 2013 was principally caused by changes in the income structure. The shares 
of imputed rent in total income surged from 7 percent to 14 percent in the Central region and 
from 7 percent to 15 percent in the Western region, whereas the shares of net income from 
agriculture were reduced dramatically, from 43 percent to 19 percent in the Central region and 
from 46 percent to 28 percent in the Western region. With respect to the Eastern region, although 
the change in income composition is less distinct, the share of imputed rent increased slightly 
from 11 percent to 19 percent. According to this analysis of income composition, the major cause 
of the worsening income inequality was the sharp increase in imputed rent from owner-occupied 
housing. To more closely investigate the contributions to income inequality by income source, in 
the next section we employ the Gini decomposition method. 
 
III. Inequality Decomposition by Income Components 
A. Decomposition Methods 
We follow the Gini decomposition method proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Stark, 
Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986) to investigate the contribution of each income component to per 
capita income inequality. Let kY  ( Kk ,,1= ) represent the k th component of household 
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income and Y  be the total household income, such that ∑= k kYY . The Gini coefficient of 
per capita income is defined as follows: 
∑∑ == k kkkk k RYGuSYG )()(       (1) 
where ku  denotes the share of component k  income, kS denotes the contribution of the k th 
component to total income inequality, and )( kYG  is the Gini coefficient corresponding to 
income component k . kR  is the ratio of Spearman’s rank correlation between income from 
source k  and the cumulative distribution (.)F  of total household income or income from the 
k th component , which is expressed as: 
 
))(,cov(
))(,cov(
kk
k
k YFY
YFYR = .                   (2) 
 
Therefore, the contribution of the k th component of income to total income inequality can be 
measured as: 
                  ∑∑ == k kkk kkkk cuYG
RYGus
)(
)(
                (3) 
where kc denotes the pseudo-Gini coefficient (or the coefficient of concentration). However, 
Shorrocks (1982) points out a serious defect in this Gini decomposition method because the 
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coefficients are not determined uniquely since they depend on the precise formula used to 
represent the inequality index. Therefore, the method cannot guarantee independence from the 
inequality measure selection. Therefore, Shorrocks (1982) proposes a theoretically consistent 
decomposition formula in which the coefficients of the decomposition are uniquely determined. 
The contribution of income component k  is defined as follows: 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 = 𝑆𝑆(𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘,𝑌𝑌)𝐺𝐺(𝑌𝑌) = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘,𝑌𝑌)𝜎𝜎2(𝑌𝑌) .                (4) 
 
Employing these two decomposition methods, we divide the income sources into six 
components to discuss the contribution of each component during the twenty-five years of our 
data. 
 
B. Results of the Decomposition 
The results of the Gini decomposition of adjusted per capita income are summarized in Figures 
5.3 and 5.4. Figure 5.3 shows the percentage share of each income component in total income 
and Figure 5.4 shows the contribution of each income component to total income inequality. The 
share of net income from agriculture dropped significantly, from 76.5 percent in 1988 to 56.8 
17 
 
percent in 1995, and its contribution to total income inequality also declined from 57.4 percent in 
1988 to 35.4 percent in 1995.8 Both the share in total income and the contribution to total 
income inequality of net income from agriculture continued to decline in 2002, 2007, and 2013. 
In 2013 the share of agricultural income in total income dropped to 19.0 percent, while its 
contribution to total income inequality dropped to 11.9 percent. It should be noted that the 
contribution of net income from agriculture to the total income inequality is uniformly below its 
share in total income, indicating that agriculture, as the self-employed livelihood sector, acts as 
an equalizing income component. 
Unlike the share of agricultural income and its contribution to total inequality, as shown in 
Figure 5.5 the coefficient of concentration (the pseudo-Gini coefficient) for net income from 
agriculture continuously increased from 1988 until 2013. This suggests that inter-household 
disparities in agricultural production were enlarging as the relative share of the agricultural sector 
declined. It should also be noted that regional disparities in the distributive effects of net income 
from agriculture have expanded. The coefficients of concentration for net income from 
                                                   
8 It should be noted that self-consumption of agricultural products by rural households accounted for a 
large share of total and farm management income. Specifically, the shares of self-consumption of 
agricultural products in farm management and total income accounted for 62.9 percent in 1988 and 48.1 
percent in 1995. An evaluation of self-consumption involves the problem of how to estimate “market 
prices.” The 1988 CHIP survey questionnaire required that respondents evaluate the value of self-
consumption of agricultural products by market price. Because the development of agricultural markets 
remained at a preliminary stage during the late 1980s, the estimated values contain relatively large 
measurement errors. 
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agriculture in 1988 were 0.317 in the Eastern region, 0.306 in the Central region, and 0.321 in 
the Western region, suggesting that agricultural activities were rather homogeneous among all 
regions. In 2013, however, the relevant figures were 0.852 in the Eastern region, 0.663 in the 
Central region, and 0.664 in the Western region. The variation in agricultural activity is largest in 
the most developed regions. 
These large disparities in agricultural income are a result of implementation of the “agro-
industrialization” (nongye chanyehua) agricultural policy in the late 1990s. Central and local 
governments evaluated the integration of small farmers by agribusiness enterprises through 
contract farming, mainly occurring in the coastal provinces, and began to officially support the 
establishment of agricultural conglomerates through contract farming. These agricultural policies 
were aimed at increasing the profitability of agricultural production and improving the living 
standards of rural residents (Fock and Zachernuk 2006; Nongyebu, Nongye chanyehua 
bangongshi, Nongyebu nongcun jingji yanjiu zhongxin 2008).  
The penetration of agro-industrialization appears to facilitate the diversification of agricultural 
production into large-scale specialized farming and self-supported small-scale farming. 
According to our calculations using published data (Nongyebu (Ministry of Agriculture) 2010, 
2014), the percentage shares of leased-in farmland to total contracted farmland have been 
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increasing rapidly since the end of the 2000s, with the share rising to 25.7 percent in 2013 from 
its 12.0 percent in 2009. Related to this, institutional arrangements that allow and encourage the 
development of rental markets for farmland are a source of the diversification of farming 
structures. Namely, implementation of the Rural Cultivated Land Contracting Law in 2003 and 
policy support for farmland rental transactions have facilitated the diversification of agricultural 
production (Gao, Huang, and Rozelle 2012). These agricultural structural changes are reflected 
in the increasing coefficients of concentration for net income from agriculture. 
In contrast to agricultural income, a different trend is revealed in wage earnings, including 
migration income. The percentage share of wage earnings in total income jumped from 11.1 
percent in 1988 to 36.6 percent in 2002, and its contribution to total income inequality doubled 
from 22.6 percent in 1988 to 44.8 percent in 2002. The contribution of wage earnings to total 
inequality was higher than its share in total income between 1988 and 2002, indicating that wage 
earnings rapidly expanded to become the most influential income component. At the same time, 
it should be noted that the coefficient of concentration for wage earnings had been declining 
from a considerably elevated level of 0.903 in 1988 to 0.649 in 2002 (see Figure 5.5). This 
finding reflects the expansion of non-agricultural job opportunities. However, as shown by 
Zhang (2001) and Li (2001), the development of rural industries, such as the TVEs, remained 
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geographically unbalanced, and opportunities to secure off-farm occupations were relatively 
limited until the early 2000s.9 Therefore, rural households that were in relatively developed 
areas or laborers who had more opportunities to migrate appear to have benefited from wage 
income more than others, thus accelerating income inequalities among rural households.  
[Figure 5.3 about here] 
[Figure 5.4 about here] 
From 2002 to 2013, however, off-farm opportunities, including migrant jobs, continued to 
expand and spread widely, hence the relatively easy access to off-farm jobs mitigated the 
disparity effects of wage earnings. More specifically, the share of wage earnings in total income 
continued to increase, from 36.6 percent in 2002 to 44.5 percent in 2013, and the coefficients of 
concentration decreased from 0.649 in 2002 to 0.557 in 2013, resulting in an approximately 
constant contribution of wage earnings to total income inequality, at 40-45 percent. Luo and 
Sicular (2013) point out that the contributions from migration and local employment were quite 
different between 2002 and 2007, but the total contributions from wage earnings, including 
migration income, remained at the same level during this period. 
                                                   
9 As discussed in Glauben, Herzfeld, and Wang (2008) and Yang (1997, 2004), the probability of 
obtaining off-farm occupations was determined significantly by the attributes of the rural households (i.e., 
age, educational level, and household size) as well as by the economic conditions in each locality. 
21 
 
Due to data limitations in the 2013 CHIP, we could not disaggregate the contributions from 
migrant and local employment to wage earnings. However, considering the ongoing increase in 
Chinese migrant labor from 140.41 million people in 2008 to 166.10 million people in 2013 as 
estimated by the NBS,10 it was highly likely that an increasing contribution of migration income 
was offset by a reduction in the contribution of local employment. This evolution of off-farm 
employment from initial scarcity to becoming more prevalent as well as the continuous growth 
of migrant labor appear to characterize the change in overall income inequality in rural China. 
[Figure 5.5 about here] 
The share of asset income in total income remained at less than 1 percent until 2002. Although 
the share of asset income in total income was still relatively small in 2013, its contribution to 
total income inequality became more significant in the second decade of the 2000s, at 9.3 percent 
by 2013. However, the contributions of imputed rent began to increase rapidly from the 
beginning of the 2000s. The percentage share of imputed rent in total income increased from 6.4 
percent in 2002 to 15.6 percent in 2013, while the contribution to total income inequality also 
increased from 5.5 percent to 16.6 percent between 2002 and 2013. Although the reform of 
property rights for rural land and housing is still at an early experimental stage, the increase in 
                                                   
10 See Nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao 2015.  
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imputed rent suggests that rural housing will possibly become a new source of inequality in the 
future.   
[Figure 5.6 about here] 
The estimation results of the inequality decomposition using the Shorrocks decomposition are 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. The trend in contributions by income sources is generally consistent 
with that of the Gini decomposition, but the contributions of wage earnings have fallen 
considerably since 2002. Whereas the contribution of imputed rent increased dramatically from 
1988 through 2013 (except for 1995), the contributions of agricultural management and wage 
earnings were less outstanding compared with those of the Gini decomposition in both 1988 and 
1995. However, the contributions of non-agricultural businesses estimated by the Shorrocks 
method were substantially larger than those of the Gini decomposition during this period, with 
the contributions estimated by the Shorrocks method in 2007 and 2013 at 23.3 percent and 25.7 
percent, respectively. 
 
C. Change in the Public Transfer Policy 
Changes in the direct effects of public policy on households can be traced using the impacts of 
public transfers on total income. Here we examine the trend of the percentage share of net public 
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transfers in total income and its contribution to income inequality. As reported in Figure 5.3, the 
percentage share of net public transfers in 1988 was slightly negative at an average of –0.3 
percent, while its contribution to income inequality was 3.2 percent, larger than its income share. 
These outcomes imply that, overall, the amount of public transfers to and from households 
remained balanced in 1988. 
Yet, one should focus on the differences in the percentage shares of net public transfers in 
total income among the different income strata. Table 5.2 summarizes the changes in the 
percentage shares of net transfers by income deciles during the five rounds of the CHIP surveys. 
As shown in the table, in 1988 the shares of net transfers for the bottom and second deciles were 
–16.14 percent and –4.79 percent, respectively, while those for the top deciles were 4.36 percent. 
These findings indicate that net public transfers were distributed regressively, playing a 
disequalizing role during the initial stages of the economic reforms. 
During the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the direct impact of rural public policy on 
rural household income became “exploitive” and more regressive. The shares of net public 
transfers in total income in 1988 were close to zero for the middle-income deciles. However, in 
1995 the shares of net public transfers in total income became negative for all income deciles. 
Moreover, negative public transfers, which became substantially larger for the lower income 
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deciles in 1995, accounted for –13.91 percent and –7.68 percent for the bottom and second 
deciles, respectively. Although the regressivity of the public transfers was mitigated after 1995, it 
still had not been eliminated by 2002. 
These findings clearly illustrate the increasing and heavily regressive taxes and local 
levies/fees on the “peasant burden” during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, which 
created serious social tensions in rural China. The urban-biased fiscal and investment policies of 
local governments, which were stimulated by competition over interregional economic growth 
under the fiscal decentralization policies of the post-Mao era as well as by the weak fiscal 
redistribution ability of the central government, placed a heavy financial burden on county-, 
township-, and village-level authorities and led to the “peasant burden” problem (Bernstein and 
Lü 2003; Lü 1997; Sato, Li, and Yue 2008; Yep 2004). 
[Table 5.2 about here] 
Against this background, pro-rural public policies were implemented, first by the rural 
taxation reform in 2002 and then by a series of public transfer programs.  As a result, the 
structure of public transfers fundamentally changed during the first decade of the 2000s. 
According to our analysis of the 2007 and 2013 CHIP surveys, the signs of the percentage shares 
of net transfers became positive: 4.84 percent and 4.90 percent, respectively. Their contributions 
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to inequality appear to be neutral, and slightly lower than the percentage shares. As shown in 
Table 5.2, the percentage shares are also positive for all income deciles, with the shares relatively 
favorable to the lower income deciles (except for the bottom decile). Specifically, the shares for 
the bottom decile in 2007 and 2013 are 8.55 percent and 2.86 percent, and those for the second 
decile are 5.57 percent and 9.08 percent, respectively. To further investigate the direct impacts of 
rural public policies on structural changes in rural household incomes, we will discuss in further 
detail the effects of the public transfer programs in the following section. 
 
IV. Rural Policy and Inequality 
A. Institutional and Policy Background 
Table 5.3 summarizes the major pro-rural public policies in China during the 2000s. Pro-rural 
public policies during this period are well captured by the slogan “giving more, taking less, and 
allowing peasants more opportunities” (duoyu shaoqu fanghuo) (Zhonggong zhongyang and 
Guowuyuan 2005). 
Policies for “taking less” began with the tax-for-fee (feigaishui) reform at the beginning of the 
2000s and ended with the nationwide abolition of agricultural taxes at the beginning of 2006. 
The reform of rural taxation can be divided into two phases (Sato, Li, and Yue 2008; Tian 2009). 
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The first phase (2000–2003) involved imposing newly defined agricultural taxes in place of local 
levies and fees, resulting in some reduction in the total “peasant burden” due to the taxation. The 
second phase (2004–2006) involved first a gradual reduction in the agricultural tax (including the 
special agricultural tax and the livestock tax) and then its complete abolition in January 2006, 
whereby the previously urban-biased institutional arrangements were transformed into rural (or 
agriculture)-supportive arrangements. 
[Table 5.3 about here] 
 
Despite the completion of the rural taxation reform and the increase in fiscal budgets for rural 
areas under the New Socialist Countryside Construction scheme, village collectives and 
townships still must collect money from peasants when fiscal inputs from the central/local 
governments are limited. This newly defined local levy, called the “one issue, one discussion 
collection of money and labor services” (yishi yiyi chouzi choulao), is monitored and controlled 
by the auditing department of the “peasant burden” at the county level, along with various other 
fees imposed on rural households. Therefore, although the level of rural taxation was 
fundamentally reduced after the rural taxation reform, the “peasant burden” remains a policy 
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issue.11 
Policies for “giving more” consist of various public transfer programs to rural households, 
which can be categorized into two groups: a.) production-related transfers and b.) social security 
transfers. In addition, following Lin and Wong (2012), we can further classify public transfers, in 
terms of the three types of targeted beneficiaries: 1.) universal, 2.) pro-poor, and 3.) reimbursable. 
Universal transfers provide benefits without counterpart fees/contributions to almost all rural 
households regardless of their economic status. Pro-poor transfers, which are means-tested, 
target eligible poor households. Reimbursable transfers provide partial reimbursement for 
eligible household expenditures. 
The classifications of the public transfers covered in this chapter are summarized in Table 5.4. 
It should be noted that there is one other group of public transfers: living/consumption-related 
transfers. These include subsidies for boarding students and subsidies to purchase durable goods 
and facilities, such as the subsidy for biogas digesters, the subsidy for electrical appliances 
(jiadian xiaxiang), and the subsidy for automobiles (qiche xiaxiang). Although these subsidies 
influence the level of household income as well as income inequality in rural China, the CHIP 
                                                   
11 According to our calculations using Nongyebu (2014), the average level of levies, fees, and other 
“social burdens”—43.7 yuan per capita in 2013—fell for the first time after the abolition of agricultural 
taxes. 
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surveys do not contain detailed data about them. Therefore, we concentrate on production-related 
and social security transfers in this chapter. 
[Table 5.4 about here] 
Production-related transfers include both universal and reimbursement types of subsidies. The 
direct subsidies for food grain production and comprehensive subsidies for agricultural 
production materials are classified as universal transfers. Subsidies for the SLC program, 
providing for the restoration of forests and grasslands, are also regarded as universal transfers. 
However, subsidies for purchasing improved seeds and agricultural machinery are classified as 
reimbursable transfers. 
Among the social security‒related transfers, the NRCMS and the new rural PPI program are 
categorized as reimbursable transfers. As shown in Table 5.3, because of powerful policy support 
from central and local governments for large subsidy distributions, the NRCMS rapidly 
expanded its coverage, from 18.8 percent of rural residents in 2005 to 96.0 percent of rural 
residents in 2010. Coverage reached 99.0 percent in 2013, suggesting that most rural residents 
were participating in this program. Although the subsidies for the NRCMS premium are 
distributed universally by both the central and local governments as a fixed amount (or a fixed 
ratio) to all participants, household medical expense transfers can also be classified as 
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reimbursable transfers. This is because they depend on the medical expenses that households 
have paid. 
Under the rural PPI program, pension benefits are determined by the subsidies from the 
central and local authorities as well as by the pension premium paid by the participants. 
Therefore, payments from the rural PPI can be categorized as a reimbursable transfer. Because 
the rural PPI was at an experimental stage in 2010, the program covered only 102.8 million rural 
residents, constituting 15.3 percent of the rural residents at that time. Since then, the rural PPI 
program has been merged with the urban PPI program, and the total number of participants has 
grown dramatically, reaching 497.5 million participants in 2013. 
The dibao program is an important pro-poor subsidy. This program was introduced in the 
urban areas in the early 1990s, but selected rural localities (especially the more developed 
localities) only initiated the dibao program in the early 2000s. However, the dibao program has 
been widespread since 2006, mainly because of the intensification of policy support for rural 
households as well as the transfer of authority for the dibao program from the provincial 
governments to the central government (Luo and Sicular 2013). 
The number of households that receive dibao increased rapidly from 8.3 million to 52.1 
million between 2006 and 2010. The percentage share of households in the rural total reached 7.8 
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percent in 2010. Thereafter, the expansion of households has gradually slowed, reaching 8.6 
percent of the total in 2013. In addition to dibao, pro-poor programs for rural residents also 
include the rural social assistance program for the elderly (wubao), which is the conventional 
rural social assistance program for food, clothing, housing, medical care, and burial expenses 
that began during the collective era but has recently been redefined, the poverty alleviation fund 
(fupinkuan), the medical relief fund (yiliao jiuzhu), and other social assistance programs.12 
In the following sections, we first examine the impact of the rural taxation reform (“taking 
less”) and then investigate the redistributive and poverty impacts of public transfers (“giving 
more”). In the investigation of the impacts of public transfers, we confine our analysis to public 
transfers that are universal, pro-poor, and reimbursements rather than production-related or social 
security transfers. This is because for the former we are better able to specify the beneficiaries of 
each policy, allowing for an evaluation of the policy impacts on income inequality in rural China. 
 
B. Impacts of “Taking Less” Policies 
To examine policy changes and their effects on the various income strata, we disaggregate rural 
                                                   
12 There are also pro-poor programs that provide income to poor households, such as the cash-for-work 
program (Chen et al. 2014). Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish wages from such programs from 
other wage earnings. 
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households into income deciles and calculate the taxation rate (the percentage of pre-tax income 
paid as agricultural taxes and other taxes and local levies/fees). As shown in Table 5.5, in both 
1988 and 1995 taxation rates for the bottom decile were highest among all income deciles, 
constituting 16.28 percent and 12.55 percent of pre-tax income respectively, and the shares 
declined for the higher income deciles. Comparing the shares between 1988 and 1995, the shares 
in 1995 were considerably higher than those in 1988 for all income deciles, although the gaps 
between 1988 and 1995 still declined progressively for the higher income deciles. These 
outcomes suggest that tax and fee payments were levied regressively and the burdens were most 
serious for the lower income deciles. 
A notable change in tax rates was observed in both 2007 and 2013. Specifically, the tax rates 
were reduced drastically for all income deciles, and the average shares decreased to 0.24 percent 
and 0.26 percent, respectively. These changes reflect the impacts of the comprehensive rural tax 
and the fee reforms implemented since 2000. Although the tax rates in 2007 and 2013 were 
slightly regressive, the rates were less than 1 percent for all deciles, except for the lowest decile 
in 2013. These findings suggest that “taking less” policies succeeded in resolving the problem of 
higher tax burdens for poor households in the 2000s. 
[Table 5.5 about here] 
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C. Impacts of “Giving More” Policies 
In our examination of the “giving more” policies, we focus on the 2013 CHIP to estimate the 
effects by comparing income inequality and the poverty index with/without specific transfers. 
Although the pro-poor public transfers were introduced in the early 2000s, because the CHIP 
survey was not designed to track the same households during that period it is difficult to evaluate 
the impact of specific pro-poor public transfers before and after this analysis. In addition, the 
CHIP 2007 data do not include the disaggregated amounts of the transfers, such as the universal, 
pro-poor, and reimbursable transfers. Therefore, we utilize disaggregated public transfers in 2013 
to examine the impacts on income inequality. 
[Table 5.6 about here] 
The 2013 CHIP questionnaire asked each household member whether they participated in 
social security programs. Table 5.6 reports the percentages of households that were beneficiaries 
of specific types of social security programs. The recipients of dibao constituted 6.2 percent of 
the rural households. When other types of social relief (i.e., wubao, and so forth) are added, the 
percentage share of households increased to 8.0 percent. 13 Participants in public medical 
                                                   
13 Luo and Sicular (2013) use the 2007 CHIP dataset to conduct a detailed analysis of dibao households. 
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insurance, including both the NRCMS and the employee insurance program, constituted 98.9 
percent of all rural households, of which participants in the NRCMS accounted for 90.3 percent 
of all rural households. The pension participation rate was 87.3 percent, including participants in 
the employee pension scheme and other public pension programs, while the participation rate in 
the rural PPI was 76.0 percent. Participation rates in social insurance programs in the 2013 CHIP 
rural sample are generally consistent with those described in the official national statistics, as 
shown in Table 5.3.14 
Table 5.7, based on income data from the 2013 CHIP survey, summarizes households that 
received public transfers, by both transfer types and regions. The upper part of Table 5.7 shows 
that the percentage share of households benefiting from reimbursable transfers among the total 
sample of households was the highest of all types of public transfer programs, at 59.5 percent. 
The shares were slightly higher in the less-developed provinces, i.e., those in the Central and 
Western regions. Among the reimbursable transfers, the share of rural PPI beneficiary 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Because the estimated results from our re-examination of dibao households in 2007 are consistent with 
those of Luo and Sicular (2013), we omit the descriptions for 2007. 
14 According to Golan, Sicular, and Umapathi (2015), which employs the 2007 CHIP and a related survey 
for 2008 and 2009, dibao participation rates in their dataset are notably lower than those in the official 
data during this period, as contrasted with our results for 2013. The discrepancy might be due to 
improvements in the dibao, both in terms of enforcement as well as because of increasing recognition of 
the dibao institution by rural farmers. A detailed investigation of dibao coverage over time is left for future 
research. 
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households was higher than that for public medical insurance in all regions and provinces.15 
[Table 5.7 about here] 
As shown in Table 5.7, universal transfers were widely spread and affected almost one-half of 
the rural households (46.2 percent). The share of universal transfer beneficiary households was 
relatively low in the advanced provinces, such as Beijing, Guangdong, and Jiangsu. The 
beneficiary households receiving pro-poor transfers were also a substantial proportion of the 
entire sample, constituting 36.4 percent. The share of rural households that received anti-poverty 
relief through the dibao program was 7.5 percent, slightly lower than the national average (8.6 
percent). Also, the percentage share of households receiving dibao was higher in the less-
developed provinces, such as Gansu and Sichuan in the Western region. 
The average amounts of public transfers to beneficiary households are summarized in the 
lower part of Table 5.7. The average amount of reimbursable transfers was 2,021 yuan per 
household per year, making it the largest of all types of public transfers. It is noteworthy that 
households in the Eastern region enjoyed significantly larger transfers. The same pattern is 
observed for rural PPI and public medical insurance. These results indicate that reimbursable 
transfers appear to increase income inequality in rural China. 
                                                   
15 The occurrence of reimbursable transfers through medical insurance was considerably lower in Beijing, 
Shanxi, and Gansu. 
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Meanwhile, the average pro-poor transfer was relatively large for households in the Western 
region, reaching 1,920 yuan per household. However, there were no significant differences in the 
average amount of dibao transfers between the Eastern and Western regions. This is probably 
because, in accordance with its higher minimum living costs, the Eastern region had a relatively 
stronger local fiscal capacity.  The average universal transfer was much lower than that of the 
other types of transfers and, regarding its regional differences, larger amounts were distributed in 
the Eastern and Western regions. 
 
D. Impacts of Public Transfers on Income Inequality and the Poverty Index 
To identify the impacts of public transfers on income inequality in rural China, we estimate the 
Gini coefficients with/without public transfers, assuming all else being equal. Because public 
transfers appear to be more important for lower-income households, especially households 
whose income is below the poverty line, we also estimate the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke poverty 
indices (FGT indices) with/without public transfers. The FGT indices are defined as follows: 
α
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1)(            (5) 
where z  denotes the poverty threshold, which was defined as 2,300 yuan per capita in 2010 
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prices by the NBS (Guojia tongjiju, Zhuhu diaocha bangongshi 2015) and we extended this to 
2013 using the weighted average of the rural CPI and the rural Food CPI. N  is the number of 
households, H  is the number of poor households, and iy  is the income per capita of 
household i . With the parameter 0=α , equation (5) corresponds to the headcount ratio (the 
fraction of households below the poverty line). With parameter values 1=α  and 2=α , 
equation (5) corresponds to the poverty gap index and the squared poverty gap index, 
respectively. The higher the value of parameter α , the greater the weight placed on poorer 
households. Because the official poverty level is determined according to the NBS household 
income, we exclude imputed rent from our CHIP household income to calculate the FGT indices. 
In estimating the Gini coefficients and the poverty indices, as discussed in previous 
subsections, the impacts of public transfers on income inequality differ according to the type of 
transfers. Therefore, to calculate the indices, we classify public transfers into: 1.) universal, 2.) 
pro-poor, and 3.) reimbursable transfers. Because of a lack of detailed data on public transfers, 
examination of the public transfer decomposition is limited for 2013. 
[Table 5.8 about here] 
Initially, we calculated the Gini coefficients with/without net public transfers to compare 2002 
and 2013. As described in the previous section, because negative transfers were implemented 
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between the 1990s and the early 2000s, a comparison of 2002 and 2013 will enable us to 
evaluate the impacts of the transformation of public policy on income inequality. Table 5.8 
reports the estimation results. It shows that there is slight change in the Gini coefficients between 
these years with or without net public transfers, regardless of region. However, the Gini 
coefficients for 2013 without net public transfers are approximately 3.63 percent larger than 
those with net public transfers, and the gaps are larger in the Eastern and Western regions. These 
findings indicate small but substantial improvements in the redistributive impacts of public 
transfers between 2002 and 2013. Moreover, the strength of the redistributive impacts is not 
proportional to the level of regional development, with the greatest impact being in the Western 
region and the least impact in the Central region. Therefore, it can be argued that implementation 
of pro-rural public policies during the first decade of this century represented a historical reversal 
of the urban-biased public policy in contemporary China. 
Next, we calculated the Gini coefficients with/without the three types of public transfers; the 
results are summarized in Table 5.9. The contributions of both pro-poor and reimbursable 
transfers in 2013 are high compared with those of universal transfers, both for total households 
and all regions. The largest reduction in the Gini coefficient is observed in the Eastern region, at 
2.33 percent. However, the impact of pro-poor transfers on improvements in income inequality 
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was low, although the contribution was more important (at 1.88 percent) in the Western region. 
The impact of universal transfers on income inequality accounted for only 0.51 percent, and the 
regional differences in the impacts are not obvious. 
[Table 5.9 about here] 
Although the impacts of specific public transfers on total income inequality are less distinct, 
they tend to be targeted at relatively poor households, probably resulting in an overall smaller 
impact on income inequality. Thus, we calculate the FGT indices to evaluate the impacts on 
poverty, using the official rural poverty threshold.16 Table 5.10 summarizes the estimated results 
for the FGT indices in 2013, with and without the specific types of public transfers. 
The poverty impacts of universal transfers are limited at best. Improvements in the FGT 
indices when universal transfers are included are 7.9 percent for the poverty headcount ratio 
(FGT(0)), 7.6 percent for the poverty gap (FGT(1)), and 7.2 percent for the squared poverty gap 
(FGT(2)). The poverty impacts of universal transfers differ among regions, with those in the 
Central region higher than those in the Eastern and Western regions. 
[Table 5.10 about here] 
The strength of the poverty impact from pro-poor transfers is almost the same, but inversely 
                                                   
16 The current official poverty threshold is annual per capita income of 2,300 yuan, in 2010 constant 
prices. 
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proportional to the regional developmental level. The improvement in FGT(1) when pro-poor 
transfers are included was 13.7 percent in the Eastern region, 24.5 percent in the Central region, 
and 20.7 percent in the Western region. This finding suggests that the targeting of pro-poor 
transfers worked effectively in the Central and Western regions where the incidence of poverty 
was more serious. 
Improvements in the poverty indices when public transfers are included were larger for 
reimbursable transfers than for the other two types of public transfers. Changes in the FGT 
indices improved when reimbursable transfers were included: 21.1 percent (FGT(0)), 26.0 
percent (FGT(1)), and 31.2 percent (FGT(2)). Regional differences in the poverty impacts from 
reimbursable transfers are in line with those from the two other types of public transfers, that is, 
the redistribution effects are much larger in the Eastern region than they are in the Central and 
Western regions. The impact is noteworthy in the Eastern region, where reimbursable transfers 
produce a 48.4 percent reduction in FGT(0). 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This study examines long-term changes in the distribution of rural income in China from the late 
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1980s to the mid-2010s. The major results are summarized as follows. First, regarding the results 
of a decomposition analysis of income inequality, we found contrasting trends in the 
contributions of agricultural income and wage earnings, which reflect the rapid change in rural 
household income structure caused by the dual processes of the economic development and the 
systemic transition during the post-Mao era. Both the share of total income and the contribution 
to total income inequality from agricultural income were decreasing rapidly between 1988 and 
2013. In contrast, both the share of total income and the contribution to inequality from wage 
earnings increased rapidly between 1988 and 2002, and by 2002 wage earnings had become the 
largest disequalizing income component. Between 2002 and 2013, this contribution remained 
constant, whereas its share of total income continued to increase. 
Second, the increasing contribution of asset income and imputed rent from owner-occupied 
housing to income inequality suggests that inequality in wealth is becoming increasingly 
important for an understanding of rural inequality. 
Third, there were small but substantial improvements in the redistributive impacts of public 
transfers between 2002 and 2013. Implementation of pro-rural public policies in the first decade 
of this century marked a historic reversal in the long-term urban-biased public policy of 
contemporary China. Comparing the redistributive impacts among the several types of public 
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transfers in 2013, we found that the contribution of reimbursable transfers was the largest and the 
contribution of pro-poor transfers was limited. 
Fourth, our estimations of the poverty impacts of public transfers in 2013 reveal comparable 
results to those of the redistributive impacts of public transfers. The improvement in the poverty 
indices was largest for reimbursable transfers, even though pro-poor public transfers improved 
poverty indices and the strength of the impact of poverty was relatively larger in less developed 
regions 
This study is based on aggregated indicators, such as the Gini coefficient and the FGT indices. 
To further investigate the dynamics of income inequality in rural China, it will be necessary in 
the future to carry out a further econometric examination, controlling for the socioeconomic 
attributes of households.  
 
  
42 
 
 
References 
 
Bernstein, T. and X. Lü (2003), Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brandt, L. and C. Holz (2006). “Spatial Price Differences in China: Estimates and Implications,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 55(1), 43‒86. 
Chen, Y., S. Démurger, F. Sjöholm, and J. Zheng (2014), “Pro-rural Policies, Income, and 
Inequality: Evaluating a Cash-for-Work Program in Rural China,” Asian Economic Papers, 
13(3), 87‒114. 
Fock, A. and C. Wong (2008), “Financing Rural Development for a Harmonious Society in 
China: Recent Reforms in Public Finance and Their Prospects,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 4693. 
Fock, A. and T. Zachernuk (2006), “China - Farmers Professional Associations: Review and 
Policy Recommendations,” World Bank EASRD Working Paper Series.  
Gao, L., J. Huang, and S. Rozelle (2012), “Rental Markets for Cultivated Land and Agricultural 
Investments in China,” Agricultural Economics, 43(4), 391–403. 
Glauben, T., T. Herzfeld, and X. Wang (2008), “Labor Market Participation of Chinese 
43 
 
Agricultural Households: Empirical Evidence from Zhejiang Province,” Food Policy, 33(4), 
329–340. 
Golan, J., T. Sicular, and N. Umapathi (2015), “Unconditional Cash Transfers in China: An 
Analysis of the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee Program,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 7374.  
Guojia tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics), ed. (various years), Zhongguo tongji nianjian  
     2015 China Statistical Yearbook 2015). Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe. 
Guojia tongjiju, Zhuhu diaocha bangongshi (Department of Household Surveys of the NBS), ed. 
(2014), Zhongguo zhuhu diaocha nianjian 2014 (China Yearbook of Household Survey 
2014). Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe.  
Guojia tongjiju, Zhuhu diaocha bangongshi (Department of Household Surveys of the NBS), 
comp. (2015), Zhongguo nongcun pinkun jiance baogao 2015 (Poverty Monitoring Report 
of Rural China 2015). Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe.  
Hoken, H. (2014), “Grains: Marketing Systems and Agricultural Technologies for Low Prices,” 
in M. Watanabe ed., The Disintegration of Production: Firm Strategy and Industrial 
Development in China, 241–274. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
Ikegami, A. (2012), Chūgoku no shokuryō ryūtsū shisutemu (The Food Grain Distribution 
44 
 
System of China). Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō. 
Khan, A. R. and C. Riskin (2001), Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lerman, R. I. and S. Yitzhaki (1985), “Income Inequality Effects by Income Source: A New 
Approach and Applications to the United States,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 
67(1):151–156.  
Li, S. (2001), “Labor Migration and Income Distribution in Rural China,” in C. Riskin, R. Zhao, 
and S. Li, eds., China’s Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic 
Transition, 303‒328. New York: M. E. Sharpe,  
Li, S. and C. Luo (2007), “Zhongguo chengxiang jumin shouru chajude chongxin guji” (Re-
estimating the Income Gap Between Urban and Rural Households in China), Beijing daxue 
xuebao (zhexue shehui kexueban), 44(2), 111‒120. 
Li, S., H. Sato, and T. Sicular, eds. (2013), Rising Inequality in China: Challenges to a 
Harmonious Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lin, W. and C. Wong (2012), “Are Beijing’s Equalization Policies Reaching the Poor? An 
Analysis of Direct Subsidies under the ‘Three Rurals’ (Sannong),” The China Journal, no. 
67, 23‒45. 
45 
 
Lü, X. (1997), “The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China,” Journal of Peasant Studies, 
25(1), 113‒138. 
Luo, C. and T. Sicular (2013), “Inequality and Poverty in Rural China,” in S. Li, H. Sato, and T. 
Sicular, eds., Rising Inequality in China: Challenges to a Harmonious Society, 197‒229.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Department of Household Surveys, ed. (2013), China 
Yearbook of Household Survey 2013.  Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
Nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao 2015 (Monitoring Survey Report on Migrant Labor in 
2015). http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160428_1349713.html. Accessed 
December 2, 2016. 
Nongyebu (Ministry of Agriculture), ed. (2014), Zhongguo nongye tongji ziliao 2013 (China 
Agriculture Statistical Report 2014). Beijing: Zhongguo nongye chubanshe. 
Nongyebu (Ministry of Agriculture), ed. (2010), Zhongguo nongye tongji ziliao 2009 (China 
Agriculture Statistical Report 2009). Beijing: Zhongguo nongye chubanshe. 
Nongyebu, Nongye chanyehua bangongshi, Nongyebu nongcun jingji yanjiu zhongxin (Ministry 
of Agriculture, Office for Agricultural Industrialization, and Research Center for the 
Rural Economy in the Ministry of Agriculture), ed. (2008), Zhongguo nongye chanyehua 
46 
 
fazhan baogao (Development Report on Chinese Agricultural Industrialization). Beijing: 
Zhongguo nongye chubanshe. 
Qi, L. (2011), “Xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao de jianpin zengshou he zaifenpei xiaoguo yanjiu” 
(A Study of the Effects of the New Rural Cooperative Medical System on Poverty 
Alleviation, Income Growth, and Income Redistribution), Shuliang jingji jishu jingji yanjiu, 
no. 8, 35‒52. 
Riskin, C., R. Zhao, and S. Li, eds. (2001), China’s Retreat from Inequality: Income Distribution 
and Economic Transition.  Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Sato, H., S. Li, and X. Yue (2008), “The Redistributive Impact of Taxation in Rural China, 1995–
2002: An Evaluation of Rural Taxation Reform at the Turn of the Century,” in B. 
Gustafsson, S. Li, and T. Sicular, eds., Inequality and Public Policy in China, 312‒336. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sato, H., T. Sicular, and X. Yue (2013), “Housing Ownership, Incomes, and Inequality in China,” 
in S. Li, H. Sato, and T. Sicular, eds., Rising Inequality in China: Challenge to a 
Harmonious Society, 85–141. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sato, H. and Y. Wang (2014), “The Redistributive Impact of Pro-Rural Policies in the Western 
Ethnic Minority Regions of China,” mimeo. 
47 
 
Shorrocks, A. F. (1982), “Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components,” Econometrica, 
50(1), 193‒211. 
Stark, O., J. E. Taylor, and S. Yitzhaki (1986), “Remittances and Inequality,” The Economic 
Journal, 96(383), 722–740. 
Tian, J. Q. (2009), “Reorganizing Rural Public Finance: Reforms and Consequences,” Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs, 38(4), 145‒171. 
Wang, Z. (2010), “Xin nongcun jianshe de shouru zaifenpei xiaoying” (The Income 
Redistribution Effects from Construction of the New Socialist Countryside), Jingji yanjiu, 
no. 6, 17‒27. 
Yang, D. T. (1997), “Education and Off-Farm Work,” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 45(3), 613‒632. 
Yang, D. T. (2004), “Education and Allocative Efficiency: Household Income Growth during 
Rural Reforms in China,” Journal of Development Economics, 74(1), 137‒162.  
Yep, R. (2004), “Can ‘Tax-For-Fee’ Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, 
Progress and Limitations,” The China Quarterly, no. 177, 42‒70. 
Zhang, P. (2001), “Rural Interregional Inequality and Off-Farm Employment in China,” in C. 
Riskin, R. Zhao, and S. Li, eds., China’s Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and 
48 
 
Economic Transition, 213‒228. New York: M. E. Sharpe.  
Zhonggong zhongyang and Guowuyuan (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
and the State Council) (2005), “Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang 
nongcun gongzuo tigao nongye zonghe shengchan nengli ruogan zhengce de yijian” 
(Comments by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State 
Council on Reinforcing Rural Work and Improving Comprehensive Agricultural 
Productivity), December 31, 2004. 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2005/content_63347.htm.  Accessed January 7, 2017. 
  
49 
 
Table 5.1. Income per capita and Gini coefficients adjusted by regional weights and PPP 
 
Notes:  Whole rural household observations (not including migrant households) are utilized to  
estimate the per capita income and the Gini coefficient. Regional weights are calculated  
based on the share of the provincial agricultural population to the regional agricultural  
population. 
Sources: Authors’ estimations based on the CHIP surveys. We utilize the PPP index for provincial 
rural households as estimated in Brandt and Holz (2006), and extend to 2013 by utilizing the official  
CPI in the rural areas. 
  
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
(a) Income per capita (yuan) unadjusted 688 1,976 3,022 4,904 12,895
(b) Income per capita (yuan) adjusted by
regional weight and PPP 715 1,956 2,902 4,610 12,166
(c) Gini coefficient of (a) 0.351 0.400 0.376 0.371 0.408
(d) Gini coefficient of (b) 0.323 0.387 0.370 0.355 0.398
Difference between (a) and (b) (%) -3.79 1.03 4.11 6.36 5.98
Difference between (c) and (d) (%) 8.74 3.44 1.57 4.50 2.49
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Table 5.2. Percentage shares of net transfer income by region and decile 
   
Notes: 1.) Net transfer payments are defined as the sum of public transfers to households (social security 
benefits/reimbursements and other transfers from the government/collectives) minus transfers from 
households to the public sector (taxes, levies/fees, social security contributions, and other payments to the 
government/collectives). It should be noted that in this study other miscellaneous private transfers, such 
as gifts for ceremonial exchanges, are not included in the net transfer payments and in the total income. 
2.) Post-transfer per capita income is utilized as the denominator to calculate the net transfer share.  
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
 
  
Unit: %
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
0.44 -3.66 -1.61 4.84 4.90
Eastern 1.50 -2.61 -0.83 5.24 3.41
Central -2.91 -6.29 -2.93 3.57 5.33
Western 0.02 -3.69 -1.89 4.92 6.65
Bottom -16.14 -13.91 -6.00 8.55 2.86
2nd -4.79 -7.68 -3.55 5.57 9.08
3rd -2.09 -6.92 -2.99 5.24 7.81
4th -2.12 -6.57 -2.91 4.89 6.59
5th -0.70 -6.34 -3.02 4.01 7.14
6th -0.30 -5.21 -2.25 4.21 5.53
7th -0.88 -4.60 -2.12 5.41 5.03
8th 0.12 -3.77 -1.72 4.61 5.13
9th 0.98 -2.36 -1.13 4.35 3.98
Top 4.36 -0.89 0.05 4.95 3.45
Total average
Region
Decile
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Table 5.3. Major pro-rural public policies in the 2000s 
 
 
Period of  
nationwide  
implementation 
Number of beneficiaries/participants, in 
millions of persons (% of rural residents in 
parentheses) 
Policy of “Taking less”  2005 2010 2013 
Tax-for-fee (feigaishui) reform 2002 – – – 
Abolition of agricultural taxes 2006 – – – 
Policies of “Giving more”  – – – 
Direct subsidies for agricultural 
production 
2002 – – – 
Subsidies for the sloping land 
conversion (SLC) program 
2002 – – – 
New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Insurance System (NRCMS) 
2003 179 (18.8) 836 (96.0) 802 (99.0) 
Rural minimum living standard 
guarantee (dibao) 
2007 8.3 (1.1) 52.1 (7.8) 53.9 (8.6) 
Newly defined conventional rural 
social assistance (wubao, five-
guarantee assistance) 
2006 – 5.6 (0.8) 5.4 (0.9) 
New rural public pension insurance 
(PPI) program 
2009 – 102.8 (15.3) 497.5 (79.0)** 
Notes: 1.)  Direct subsidies for agricultural production include a subsidy for food grain 
production, comprehensive subsidies for agricultural production materials, subsidies for improved 
seeds, subsidies for the purchase of agricultural machinery, and other local subsidies for staple  
agricultural products. 2.) ** includes urban residents, and the percentage share is calculated by the 
total population. 
Sources: Li, Sato, and Sicular (2013); Lin and Wong (2012); Guojia tongjiju (various years). 
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Table 5.4. Classification of the pro-rural public transfers in this study 
 
 
(1) Universal types of 
transfers 
(2) Pro-poor types 
of transfers 
(3) Reimbursement 
types of transfers 
(a) Production-
related transfers 
Direct subsidies for food 
grain production, 
comprehensive subsidies for 
agricultural production 
materials, SLC subsidies  
Subsidies for 
purchasing improved 
seeds, subsidies for 
purchasing agricultural 
machinery 
(b) Social security 
transfers 
  
Dibao, wubao, 
poverty alleviation 
fund, medical relief 
fund NRCMS, rural PPI 
Sources: Lin and Wong (2012); Sato and Wang (2014). 
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Table 5.5. Tax rates by region and decile 
    
Notes: 1.) Tax payments include agricultural taxes, other taxes, and local levies/fees paid to local 
governments and collectives. 2.) Pre-tax income is used as the denominator to estimate the tax rate. 
Sources:  Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
  
Unit: %
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
3.94 4.22 2.95 0.24 0.26
Eastern 3.17 2.80 2.25 0.18 0.24
Central 6.53 6.63 4.01 0.34 0.24
Western 2.63 4.05 3.16 0.27 0.30
Bottom 16.28 12.55 8.05 0.27 1.58
2nd 7.55 7.52 4.88 0.40 0.39
3rd 6.05 7.18 4.72 0.23 0.42
4th 4.88 6.80 4.06 0.29 0.19
5th 4.66 6.26 4.08 0.22 0.32
6th 4.23 5.55 3.49 0.25 0.34
7th 3.96 5.04 3.12 0.21 0.22
8th 3.50 4.55 2.82 0.27 0.16
9th 2.91 2.95 2.24 0.14 0.22
Top 2.04 1.69 1.60 0.25 0.19
Total average
Region
Decile
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Table 5.6. Percentage share of rural households that received specific types of social security, 
2013 
 
 
Note: The observations for Xinjiang province are not included in the table because of differences between 
the Xinjiang questionnaires and those distributed elsewhere. 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the 2013 CHIP survey. 
  
% of
beneficiaries/participants
Dibao  or social relief 8.0
Dibao 6.2
Medical insurance 98.9
NCMS 90.3
Public pension insurance 87.3
Rural PPI 76.0
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Table 5.7. Percentage shares of beneficiary households among all rural households, 2013  
 
 
Notes: 1.) The average amount of public transfers is calculated only for households that receive transfers. 
2.) Households that received the transfers but the amounts were zero are excluded from the estimation. 3.) 
It is possible that the average amount of the subtotal exceeds the total. 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the 2013 CHIP survey. 
  
Dibao PPI Medical
insurance
Total 46.2 36.4 7.5 57.2 28.0 11.3
Eastern 34.6 34.3 2.8 52.8 32.9 8.7
Central 57.3 35.4 7.7 58.6 25.2 14.8
Western 45.0 40.1 12.3 60.5 26.3 9.9
Total 524 1,204 1,603 2,021 2,281 2,739
Eastern 635 767 1,770 2,833 3,212 3,816
Central 393 929 1,240 1,551 1,436 2,382
Western 638 1,920 1,846 1,810 2,011 2,369
(b) Average amount of public transfers for beneficiaries (yuan)
Universal
transfers
Pro-poor
transfers
Reimbursable
transfers
(a) Share of beneficiaries among all rural households (%)
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Table 5.8. Comparison of per capita income Gini coefficients with and without public 
transfers, 2002–2013 
 
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the 2002 and 2013 CHIP surveys. 
  
(a) Gini coefficient
with public
transfers
(b) Gini coefficient
without public
transfers
(c) % change of
Gini coefficient
(a) Gini coefficient
with public
transfers
(b) Gini coefficient
without public
transfers
(c) % change of
Gini coefficient
All households 0.370 0.371 0.22 0.395 0.409 3.63
Eastern 0.375 0.376 0.12 0.374 0.388 3.56
Central 0.289 0.292 0.91 0.363 0.377 0.43
Western 0.328 0.328 0.08 0.401 0.417 4.00
2002 2013
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Table 5.9. Per capita income Gini coefficients with and without specific public transfers, 2013 
 
    
 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the 2013 CHIP survey. 
 
 
 
 
Eastern Central Western
0.395 0.374 0.363 0.401
(i) Universal 0.397 0.376 0.366 0.403
(ii) Pro-poor 0.400 0.377 0.369 0.408
(iii) Reimbursable 0.401 0.383 0.368 0.406
% change in Gini coefficients
(i) Universal 0.51 0.33 0.75 0.58
(ii) Pro-poor 1.37 0.67 1.58 1.88
(iii) Reimbursable 1.53 2.33 1.28 1.30
Total
Gini coefficients with public
transfers
Gini coefficients without
specific public transfers
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Table 5.10. Poverty index with and without specific public transfers, 2013 
 
 
Note: The poverty indices are estimated by employing per capita income. 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the 2013 CHIP survey. 
  
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2)
0.051 0.014 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.003 0.051 0.013 0.006 0.086 0.025 0.011
(i) Universal 0.055 0.015 0.007 0.022 0.007 0.003 0.056 0.015 0.006 0.092 0.026 0.012
(ii) Pro-poor 0.058 0.017 0.008 0.023 0.007 0.004 0.058 0.016 0.007 0.100 0.030 0.014
(iii) Reimbursable 0.061 0.018 0.009 0.031 0.010 0.005 0.060 0.016 0.008 0.099 0.029 0.014
% change in poverty index
(i) Universal 7.9 7.6 7.2 5.3 1.5 -3.1 11.0 11.4 11.8 6.6 7.1 8.1
(ii) Pro-poor 14.6 20.8 23.2 11.3 13.7 13.1 14.0 24.5 29.5 16.0 20.7 23.3
(iii) Reimbursable 21.1 26.0 31.2 48.4 55.2 61.2 18.5 24.5 33.0 15.0 17.9 20.2
Central Western
Poverty index with all public
transfers
Poverty index without
specific public transfers
Total Eastern
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Figure 5.1. Real growth rates of annual income between survey rounds 
 
Notes:  Income is adjusted by the regional weight and the PPP index. Per capita income is deflated 
by the rural CPI (2013=100). The rural CPI is from Guoji tongjiju (various issues). 
Sources: The authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
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Figure 5.2. Gini coefficients of adjusted income per capita by region 
 
 
Notes: 1.) The regional classifications are as follows: Eastern region (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan), Central  
region (Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan), Western region  
(Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang). 2.) Income is adjusted by the regional weight and the PPP 
index. 
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys and National Bureau of Statistics,  
Department of Household Surveys (2013). 
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Figure 5.3. Percentage shares of income components in total income   
 
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
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Figure 5.4. Contributions of income components to income inequality 
 
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
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Figure 5.5. Comparison of the distributive effects (coefficient of concentration) of per capita 
income between agriculture and wage earnings   
 
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
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Figure 5.6. Results of the Shorrocks decomposition 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ estimation based on the CHIP surveys. 
 
 
 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Wage earnings Net income from
agriculture
Net income from non-
agricultural businesses
Asset income Net transfer payments Imputed rent from
owned housing
1988 1995 2002
2007 2013
%
